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"Imagine no possessions. I wonder if you can."
-John Lennon, "Imagine"
John Lennon apparently found it harder to imagine a world without
possessions than to imagine "there's no heaven," which he said was "easyI
if you try" or to imagine "there's no countries," which "isn't hard to do."'
Lennon was right to wonder if I could imagine a world without

possessions. Indeed, it is beyond me. Perhaps my imagination has ossified
from teaching Property for so many years. But, even when I started
teaching, I struggled to imagine a human world without possessions
In his Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law,3 Owen Jones takes us

on a Lennonesque exercise in imagination, imagining what law could
* Professor ofLaw, Indiana University-Bloomington. J.D., 1981, Georgetown University;
B.A., 1975, University of Illinois. For help, I thank Owen Jones, Robert Heidt, Joseph Hoffmann,
David Snyderand Susan Williams. Forfinancial support, I thank IndianaUniversity School ofLawBloomington and the Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellowship endowment. I am especially grateful
to the editors of the Florida Law Review for inviting me to respond to his lecture.
1. John Lennon, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971).
2. Perhaps that is why I have found teaching property so enjoyable, so comfortable.
3. Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,Non-law, and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831
(2001).
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be-but is not-in order to better understand what it is, in order to
develop, in his words, a proprioceptive sense of where law is and where it
is going.4 Overall, I find this an enlightening enterprise, and I
wholeheartedly agree with Jones's central thesis that behavioral biology
can help us understand the law. In this response, I contend both that Jones
claims too much for the ability of science to improve the law and, more
important, that Jones proceeds too cautiously in his use of evolutionary
theory. Biology and evolution help resolve some of the questions Jones
raises in his Article. Although he works at the vanguard of law and
biology,5 Jones does not push the idea of evolution by natural selection far
enough.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF LAW

Jones starts off with a paradox: law is about regulating behavior but it
has no theory of behavior. Treating this pair of facts as a paradox reflects
the same assumption that underlies William Paley's argument for God;
Jones seems to be thinking, as Paley did, that good design comes from a
designer.' Paley famously argued that if we find a watch while walking on
the heath, we cannot assume it had always been there.7 "[T]he watch must
have had a maker"; the pieces did not fall together by accident! A greater
intelligence somewhere outside of the watch, an artificer, has
comprehended its construction, designed its use, and formed it to function
as a device for telling time.9 Likewise, Paley's argument continues, the
high degree of functionality in the parts of organisms on Earth is evidence
that they were designed, rather than mere accidents ofchemistry.'0 The lens

4. See id. at 848-49.
5. To be fair, Jones's Article is more about the narrower topic of behavioral biology than
evolution by natural selection. However, as Jones notes, lying at the heart of behavioral biology is
the question of what mental modules would have been selected by evolutionary pressures. Id. at
834-35 n.4.
6. WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY: OR EVIDENCES OF THE EXIsTENCE AND
ATrRIBUTES OF THE DEITY COLLECTED FROM THE APPEARANCES OF NATURE (Early Am. Imprints,
Second Series 1802). 1 am not claiming that Jones thinks biological design must come from God.
I am merely pointing out that he has slipped into a similar mode of thinking. Jones says,
"Behavioral biology enables us to better understand the processes that built the human brain that
has in turn built that structure of law." Jones, supranote 3, at 836. I argue that our brains are a key
part of the environment within which the law grew, but they are not wholly responsible for having
"built" the law. That rabies cannot be understood without an understanding of the brain and the
brain's role in behavior does not mean that the brain built rabies.
7. PALEY, supra note 6, at 1.

8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id.

20011
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of the eye, like the lens of the telescope, must have had a designer." The
orderliness and functionality
we see in living things could not exist without
12
a supreme being, God.
There is, however, another explanation of the apparent "design" of
living creatures that does not rely on the existence ofany creative god. The
Darwinian explanation, put too briefly, is that organisms are the way they
are because that works for making more organisms. Evolution did not need
to understand itself for it to work. Nor did the organisms evolving need to
understand what was happening. Of many random changes, some were
beneficial for producing offspring, and those tended to become more
prevalent merely by virtue of their benefit.
If that approach works to explain the structure of carbon-based life
forms, it might also work to explain systems of law. Jones says that
"behavioral biology enables us to better understand the processes that built
the human brain that has in turn built that structure of law."' 3 By attributing
law's construction to the human brain rather than to unthinking selective
processes, Jones seems to have assumed that human brains designed the
law, just as Paley assumed that some being must have designed animals.
Of course, Jones is more correct than Paley was. Humans do design laws.
I am arguing, however, that humans are not wholly responsible for the
design of existing legal structures and I am contending that evolutionary
analysis can help us to understand the law without the intermediate step of
understanding the mind. Ifwe can see law as an organically developing set
of legal ideas, we can apply evolutionary theory directly. 4 Richard
Dawkins coined the term "meme" to refer to cultural information that
replicates. 5 Surely our laws are examples of replicating bits of
information. Seeing laws as memes resolves Jones's paradox; laws exist
because they work for regulating behavior. 6 To make an analogy, the first
people to salt meat had no good theory of how salt preserved food. But
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id. at 36.
13. Jones, supra note 3, at 836.
14. Jones acknowledges this memetic approach to understanding law when he says "I am not
claiming that patterns in existing law are not also directly susceptible ofidentification with methods
of evolutionary analysis." Id. at 857. Nevertheless, he does not make much of it. Although I think
that this alternative avenue of analysis is important, I do not criticize Jones for failing to speak to
a topic he did not intend to address. I wish only to make it clear that there are ways of
understanding the development of the law that do not depend so heavily on humans knowing why
laws work.
15. RICHARD DAWKiNS, THE SELFISH GENE 205-06 (Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
16. A law can "work" in various ways. Sometimes the law serves the interests of those who
write or enforce the laws. Other times the law serves the interests of the population governed by it.
It is also possible for a law to work in the sense that it helps perpetuate itself or the larger legal
structure in which it is embedded. In addition, a law does not necessarily work by modifying the
behavior focused upon; jaywalking proscriptions may be useful in regulating other behaviors.
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theory did not matter; the salting meme worked. Likewise, early peoples
did not need a true theory of human behavior to see that certain socially
enforced rules served a useful purpose of reducing behaviors with negative
externalities. Laws did not have to be based on science to work any more
than the practice of salting meat had to be based on science to work. What
works tends to get reiterated.
Throughout history, the adoption and perpetuation of laws was of
course aided, in part, by a series of thoughts and theories and philosophies
about human behavior held by those who had the power to make the rules.
But those theories did not have to be true. They did not have to be well
accepted among the public or among lawmakers. It was enough that the
laws worked in a general way to help perpetuate the people enforcing the
laws or the societies adhering to them. Even that was not necessary. It is
possible for laws to exist, to be passed down, even though the laws are
harmful to their host societies. Eventually, such harmful laws, might, like
communism in some places, put their hosts under such a competitive
disadvantage that the society holding those laws has a hard time surviving.
But it can survive for a while. We cannot tell by the mere existence of laws
that they are beneficial for society. There are many ways for ideas, legal
and otherwise, to survive and replicate.
The point here is that a good theory of human behavior is not necessary
for the creation or cor4inuation of an effective law. The lawmakers of a
state could believe that alcohol consumption switches control of behavior
from the good side of the brain to the evil side. Based on that theory, they
could write a law imposing a $10.00 tax each time a person drinks an
alcoholic beverage. The law would discourage alcohol consumption even
though the underlying science was bad. Jones says that the lever of law
works against a fulcrum of science, a behavioral model provided by the
science of human behavior. 7 "[Ljaw can be no more effective than the
solidity that its fulcrum affords." 8 One response is that the law operates
not as a lever but instead as a magnet, pulling or pushing on human
behavior. Even assuming law acts as a lever, however, the fulcrum on
which the law pivots is not science, for science is merely our knowledge
of the way things work. The fulcrum for law's leverage is not our
knowledge. The fulcrum is, instead, the underlying truth, the underlying
patterns of human behavioral response to stimuli. It is the reality, not our
model, that matters. Just as a billiards player does not need a theory of
physics to make use of the fact that the angle of reflection equals the angle

17. Jones, supranote 3, at 841. "[T]he fulcrum ... is the law's behavioral model. By the term
behavioral model, I refer to our conception of where behavior generally comes from. .. ." Id.
(emphasis added).
18. Id. at 845. In the same vein, he says "law's efficiency is dependent on a solid...
behavioral model." Id.
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of incidence, we can make use of the behavioral fulcrum, and have for a
long time made use of that fulcrum, without much scientific understanding
of it. We can make a law, observe its effects on behavior, and determine
whether to keep the law, all without any theory.
For similar reasons, I am skeptical of the potential for behavioral
biology to yield much proprioception regarding where the law will go in
the future. Certainly behavioral biology will play a part in reform. And
when it gets there, various forms of evolutionary analysis will help us to
understand how it has done so. But the ability to predict where law will go
next is beyond my horizon, even when I stand on the shoulders of giants.
The problem is that there are too many interdependent variables. I have no
more hope for sensing where the law will grow than sensing how humans
will evolve.
Jones says that the idea that law "evolves" toward efficiency is
"analogical" to biology.19 While I agree that the evolution of law is
analogous to the evolution of biological organisms, I do not believe that
the forces working on law are merely similar to the forces of natural
selection; they are the same forces of selection. All that is needed for
natural selection is reproduction with variation, errors that are large enough
to make a difference to further reproduction. A change in hair color might
not be enough of an error in humans to be the basis for variable
reproduction, but might suffice in a species that relies on camouflage.
Imperfect reproduction is enough to generate changes in the relative
frequency of any replicators, including legal ideas. And changes in the
existing mix of laws is evolution of law.20
I want to be careful to point out that I am not arguing with many of
Jones's points. I am no more denying that we have a common brain
structure than I would deny that we have common internal organs or feet
and hands. Nor am I arguing with the important observation that law works
as well as it does for controlling behavior because we share a common
brain structure. However, I do take issue with the idea that the efficacy of
the law depends on our scientific understanding of that common structure.
Useful rules can evolve without our knowing why they work. We do not
need to know why punishment reduces many behaviors in order to know
that it does. In some cases, we do not even have to know that a law works
well (much less why) in order for that law to survive, to replicate into the
future.

19. Id. at 858.
20. To get extinction of some species of animal (or law), we need death in addition to
replication with variation, but death is not necessary for evolution if evolution is defined as a shift

in the mix of organisms.
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A- A Theoretical CautionaryNote
This brings me to my second point: it is important not to claim too
much for the ability of science to improve law. In keeping with the idea of
a watchmaking intelligence and inconsistent with the idea of law as a
complex ofmemes, Jones contends that a better science of human behavior
will lead to better laws for regulating human behavior. That sounds good,
indeed it sounded good enough to me in the past to have agreed with it,2
but as Paley's argument from design exemplifies, sounding good does not
make it true. Certainly, a watchmaker can make a better watch if he
understands how it works. But law has other ways of improving,
independent of its designers' knowledge. Law can evolve in beneficial
directions without being designed by us based on a true theory of human
behavior, indeed without being designed by us in any but the very loosest
sense.
Among the many theories of legal evolution, some focus on the
possibility that law has evolved toward an efficient set of rules. One
hypothesis states that inefficient laws will lead to bad situations that will
create more opportunities for re-litigation than would the efficient rule.2"
Therefore, even assuming that judges make decisions randomly (i.e.,
without any design at all), and that therefore some efficient rules might be
discarded in favor of inefficient rules, the whole body of law might
nevertheless evolve in a direction of greater overall efficiency. Jones is
aware of this literature,' yet he, like many in the academy, shows too little
appreciation for the random accretion of small improvements. To take a
simple example, Indiana might adopt a loitering law by copying another
state's statute and later find that the prohibition was quite useful in helping
police to apprehend drug dealers.
This argument goes further than merely saying that law might improve
by the forces of natural selection working upon replicating ideas. The
argument from natural selection warns that intended improvements based
on scientific knowledge of the brain might actually make law worse.
Evolutionary analysis suggests that as genes make up a body, specific laws
make up an integrated, organic meme complex. We might think we can

21. See generallyJeffrey Evans Stake, CanEvolutionaryScience Contributeto Discussions

ofLaw?, 41

JuRimTmics

J. 379 (2001).

22. See generally Robert Cooter & Lewis Komhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1980); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary
Models inJurisprudence,64TEX.L.REv. 645 (1985); GeorgeL. Priest, The Common Law Process
and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive
Aspects ofJudicialDecisions,79 GEO. L. J. 1447, 1477-92 (1991).
23. See Jones, supra note 3, at 858 n.21.
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improve the law by tinkering with a particular rule, but it is unlikely that
we will anticipate all of a rule's interconnections with other laws and all
ofthe effects on society. Just as there is no certainty that scientific changes
to an ecosystem or a human's genetic structure will be beneficial, there is
no certainty that scientific changes to our legal structure will turn out to be
improvements.
B. Preservinga Culture Within Which Good Laws Can Thrive
Beyond the danger that individual reforms might reduce human welfare,
there is an additional risk raised by placing undue emphasis on science, the
danger of universality. Some scientific reformers will believe so strongly
in their positions that they will urge universal24 adoption of their
prescriptions. The reason this is risky is that there is much to be said for
allowing experimentation by variation. If two states adopt different rules,
we might learn about the relative merits of those rules by studying
subsequent effects. When all states have the same rules, it becomes harder
to make such comparisons. Moreover, even without studied comparisons,
variation allows competition, which creates the possibility for better
systems to outrun weaker ones. Finally, transitions are much less costly
when states avoid the mistaken reforms initiated in a few jurisdictions.
There are already strong forces pushing us away from the experimental
approach. The American Law Institute-American Bar Association
publishes "Restatements" '25 - some of which have little to do with actually
restating the law 6 -that push courts toward adopting the same rules. On
the legislative front, the Commission on Uniform Laws publishes and
promotes statutes that would make the law in many areas the same across
the nation.
This monolithic approach is not always a bad thing. There are costs to
maintaining different laws in different jurisdictions. One obvious cost is
that lawyers in one state cannot practice in another. This is bad for the
lawyers wanting to practice in newjurisdictions and it could raise the costs
to purchasers of legal services. However, it is probably not terribly costly
for clients. For most types of lawyering, the market is thick and

24. The meaning of "universal" will vary with the context. Ifthe laws of Property are at issue,
universal adoption means in all of the States, or perhaps all common law countries. If human rights
are at issue, universal adoption means adoption by most or all nations on Earth.
25. See, e.g., 69 U.S.L.W. 2736 (2001) (reporting that the American Law Institute approves
Tentative DraftNo. 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Property, regarding "Wills and Other Donative
Transfers").
26. For evidence that the Restatement may deviate substantially from the existing law,
consider that the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) eliminates the touch and concern
element from the doctrine of servitudes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERvrruDES § 3.1

cmt. a (2000).
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competitive enough that prices are close to marginal cost and would not
diminish much if all lawyers could practice in all jurisdictions.
A better example of the costs of legal diversity might be laws regarding
childhood vaccinations. Requiring or facilitating vaccinations around the
world can lead to the eradication of diseases such as smallpox that will
remain a threat if vaccinations take place in only some jurisdictions. As
another example, a business in New York might hesitate to trade with one
in California if it has no confidence that the basic rules of commerce will
be those it is accustomed to following. Network externalities can make
uniformity important.
But the beneficial network externalities are not so large in other legal
subjects. The costs of having differing levels of state sales tax are not too
great, and in return states can experiment with different levels of tax and
learn from, and even compete with, each other. On the flip side of the
revenue coin, there are not many serious proposals that all states should be
required to spend the same amount on higher education. South Carolina
and North Carolina diverged some years ago on that issue, and we can
learn today from that natural experiment.
To take an example outside of the budgetary domain, it is not hard to
argue that there has been a benefit to diversity in recording acts. Many of
the early acts were what could be classified as "pure race" statutes. Under
these statutes, subsequent purchasers take priority over earlier purchasers
merely by recording first. That approach apparently looked good to many
reformers of the time. But it quickly became obvious that such statutes
created possibilities of unfairness and abuse. A subsequent purchaser
would defeat the claim ofan earlier buyer even if the subsequent purchaser
was fully aware that the earlier buyer had a legitimate claim of ownership.
Because the recording act reform was piecemeal rather than universal, the
courts and legislatures of the various states were able fairly easily and
quickly to amend their laws so that bad faith would prevent a subsequent
purchaser from taking title from an earlier owner. Those confronting bad
laws had the opportunity to learn from neighboring states and had the
power to implement reform without having to get a whole nation to go
along. Thus the recording law developed fairly quickly into a set of fairer
rules of priority.27 There are large benefits to legal diversity, a form of
memetic diversity,2" just as there are large benefits to genetic diversity.

27. This improved fairness may have come at the price of diminished efficiency.
28. I would like to suggest that we use the word "leme" to refer to legal memes, but it is not
clear how the meaning would differ from that of"rule." The benefit of using the word "leme" would
be that it would more directly suggest the replicating nature of legal rules.
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C. Empirically FoundedCautionaryNotes
In addition to the theoretical objections to placing too much emphasis
on science, there are empirical issues as well. There are, of course,
examples on both sides. It appears that science relating to absence of
differences between races and the unequal effects of "separate but equal"
helped the Supreme Court to reach its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,29 and most scholars would agree that decision improved the
law. Better "germ theory" has led to improvements in the substance of
international law on infectious disease control.30 Science relating to the
difference between men's and women's reactions to sexualization of the
workplace (pornography, sexual banter, touching, etc.) has been used to
modify the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases to make
it a reasonable woman standard where the plaintiff is a woman."' In
addition, it is likely that as science creates new investigatory tools, the law
of evidence will change to allow evidence based on such tools.
But science does not always lead to better law. In some cases, the
policymakers are unaware of the science or they ignore scientific findings.
For example, there is evidence that police line-ups would produce fewer
false positive identifications (and the same number of accurate
identifications) if the witnesses viewed the pictures of the suspects
sequentially instead of as a group. 2 Yet the law does not require sequential
line-ups. Preliminary research also suggests that counseling for convicted
wife-beaters might decrease the incidence of repeat violence, but
prosecutors in Florida sued to stop the research program.33 An article by
Alex Tanford regarding jury instructions indicates that appellate courts
actually changed the law in the opposite direction from what scientific
research would support.34 In other cases, the reforms are questioned as illadvised. For example, legal realists reformed commercial law to conform
to what social science said were actual business practices, but neoformalists are now arguing that some of those changes were not
improvements.
In sum, there are both theoretical and empirical arguments that law
reforms based on new scientific knowledge will not always turn out to be
improvements. I am not saying we should not try to use what we know
from science to improve the law, but we should not be overly confident

29. Brown v. Bd.of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
30. See DAVID FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAWAND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 53 (1999).
31. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
32. See Atul Gawande, UnderSuspicion: The Fugitive Science of CriminalJustice,NEW
YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 52.

33. Id.
34. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts,Legislatures,and CommissionsFollowing
EmpiricalResearch on Jury Instructions,25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 155, 160 (1991).
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that it will. Claiming too much for the application of science, even
behavioral science, will lead to disappointment and distrust, making it
harder for science to play a constructive role.
II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS
That substantial caveat aside, in the following parts I suggest a few
ways in which evolutionary thinking can contribute to positive and
normative analyses of law in addition to those mentioned by Jones.35 I have
already discussed how it can help us understand the organic development
of the law. Beyond that, first, a closely related application uses
evolutionary analysis to understand the development of other, non-legal,
ideas and to design law to fit with that understanding. Second, the new
science of behavioral biology is helping us understand the contours of
traditional legal doctrine. Third, behavioral biology will affect the way we
think about legal concepts such as moral responsibility, perhaps helping us
both to reach a more satisfactory philosophical foundation for our law and
to develop rules that fit our normative theory. Along these lines, science
might also help us to see and accept alternatives to legal sanctions,
alternatives such as drugs that influence behavior by altering brain
chemistry. Fourth, behavioral biology will help us more accurately predict
the costs and benefits of legal rules designed to influence behavior. One of
the problems faced by economics is that there is no way to compare
preferences. The general scale of "utility" is invoked, but there is little way
to predict from economic theory which status yields more utility.
Evolutionary analysis has the advantage of placing all preferences on a
single ultimate scale, that ofyielding grandchildren.36 If one preference led
to more grandchildren than another, the former should be stronger today.
Although much of the analysis is the same in economics and biology,
biology's single utility scale should offer additional predictive and
explanatory power.
A. DevelopingNew Doctrine
A greater understanding of how ideas behave may allow us to improve
our laws relating to those ideas. For example, memetic analysis has
provided an alternative to the traditional marketplace of ideas metaphor
often invoked in First Amendment jurisprudence.37 The marketplace
metaphor suggests that we produce, offer for sale, and buy (or reject) ideas.

35. See Jones, supra note 3, at 834-35 nn.4 & 5.

36. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the idea of inclusive fitness, which includes
all relatives according to their relatedness.
37. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers orHosts?:A Memetic Approach to FreeSpeech,

52 ALA. L. Rnv. 1213, 1214 (2001).
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We humans are the active agents; ideas are mere passive products. This is,
of course, a comfortable thought. If ideas have no agency, humans must be
in control. Humans may be evil, but at least we know the enemy, and it is
us. Like the trash lying around the Okefenokee Swamp in the "Pogo"
comic strip," inert bad ideas could be cleaned up by getting people to
change their evil ways.
But what if bad ideas are more like viruses than trash. As we have seen
with AIDS, viruses are not so easily contained and cleaned up. The
solution requires more than getting everyone to agree that they will not get
AIDS because the virus has agency. It acts against our will. As noted
above, ideas are replicators too. The better replicators have ways of making
it into the next generation whether we want them to survive or not. Ideas
are in it for their own good, not for ours. Thus, it is hopelessly optimistic
to believe that the ideas that survive and replicate will be those that are best
for human welfare. The truth will not always be the winner in the battle
between ideas.39 The ideas that survive will be those that are good at
surviving. Sometimes being good for humans will be good for an idea's
survival. But ideas can find ways to replicate even if they are not good for
people.
One of the ways ideas improve their chances of replication is to kill off
the holders of opposing ideas, a form of memocide.4" Some ideas take
advantage of the graciousness of other ideas, using their tolerance of
opposing ideas to get a foothold and then eliminating tolerance when they
are in control.41 For that reason, our law, our First Amendment
jurisprudence, should not be read to protect all ideas. Tolerance will last
only as long as the benign ideas are in control. When a bad idea such as

38. Wait Kelly, Pogo: We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us, Pogo, Earth Day cartoon
poster, 1970, availableat httpj/www.igopogo.com/wehavemet.htm.
39. As Blaise Pascal observed, it could be rational for humans to believe in Christ as our
Savior even ifit were highly unlikely that Christ is in fact our Savior. See generallyBLAISEPASCAL,
PENStES: THE PROVINCIAL LErrmRs (W.F. Trotter trans., Random House 1941).
40. Genocide is the elimination of humans holding competing genes. Memocide is the
elimination of humans holding competing memes. Stake, supra note 37, at 1240.
41. For evidence that the Nazis used exactly this approach, see Justice Jackson's dissent in
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 35 (1949), quoting Joseph Goebbels:
[W]hen democracy granted democratic methods for us in the times of opposition,
this [Nazi seizure of power] was bound to happen in a democratic system.
However, we National Socialists never asserted that we represented a democratic
point of view, but we have declared openly thatwe used democratic methods only
in order to gain the power and that, after assuming the power, we would deny to
our adversaries without any consideration the means which were granted to us in

the times of [our] opposition.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,35 (1949).
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Naziism gains the upper hand, tolerance will be nowhere to be found. The
power of the evil memes lies in their ability to silence the opposition by
threatening harm to holders of opposing ideas. Therefore, the prescription
provided by memetic analysis is that states should have the power and
freedom to outlaw promulgation of ideas that urge harm to holders of
opposing ideas.
The application ofmemetics to free speech and other First Amendment
issues is just one example of better living through science. As the
evolutionary science of memetics advances, we may see new applications
to our laws about various forms of intellectual property, patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. Wherever the subject matter of the law is
ideas, memetics may be useful.
B. UnderstandingTraditionalDoctrine
In the law of property, ownership often turns on first possession. But
what does it take to establish possession? In a nineteenth century case
known to generations of law students, Pierson v. Post,42 the New York
Court of Appeals confronted this question. The judges hearing the case
decided that title in a fox belonged not to the first person to hound it but
rather to the first person to grab it.43 Although it could be argued that this
important legal line in the sand is arbitrary, evolutionary theory suggests
that humans may share a common understanding of what level of physical
control is enough to make a person an owner.
John Maynard Smith and others have developed a theory that animals
may be genetically programmed to be assertive in defending food in their
possession and deferential with regard to food held by other similar
animals." This is sometimes called the "Bourgeois" strategy. 45 Depending
on the payoffs to fighting, this strategy can be an evolutionarily stable
strategy.46 For the strategy to work, both parties to a potential fight must be
able to tell which has "possession;" the two must respond to the same
environmental trigger. Those prehistoric humans that did not have the
common sense of possession found themselves trying to grab what would
be defended fiercely rather than grabbing what could be taken without
encountering much resistance. Those who did not know the prevailing

42. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
43. See id.
44. JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES

22 (1982);

ROBERT

SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE 101-03 (1986). Eric Posner
has discussed the application of the Bourgeois strategy in the development of constitutions and
property. ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMs 45 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Constitutional
Possibility and Constitutional Evolution 11 (on file with author).
45. SMITH, supra note 44, at 22.
46. Id. at 23.
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definition did not know when to be assertive and when to be deferential.
Humans without the property-recognition gene had their genes eliminated
from the gene pool.
In other words, evolutionarily stable patterns of behavior could have
developed around a shared sense of what is in a person's possession and
what is not. It is possible that a common sense of possession built into our
brain structure helps to solve the coordination problem that arises from
scarcity of goods. Notice that communication is another large coordination
problem. Because communication aids reproduction, our brains have
evolved in a way that helps us communicate. Just as we have brain
modules for grammar,47 we might have a sense of ownership that is rooted
in our biology.
There are some physiological facts that make the theory plausible.
Scientists have established that a certain group of neurons fire when a
monkey grasps a piece of food in a certain way.48 Moreover, when another
monkey or the human experimenter grasps the food in the same way, the
same neurons (called "mirror neurons") fire in the monkey.49 Although
there are "mirror neurons" for many actions, the fact that there are neurons
activated by observing the act of grasping raises the possibility that there
may be neurons associated with recognizing possession. We may be
programmed to recognize when we have a certain proximate relationship
to a physical object and, by mirroring, to recognize when others have a
similar relationship to an object. Our brains may then determine
"ownership" by combining that relational data with information about
previous relationships. Certain combinations of information---"it is in my
grasp" plus "there is no previous owner"--may throw a biological switch
making us more willing to be assertive in preventing others from taking the
thing. Such a neurological structure may provide the basis for a very
"natural" law of property.
In short, even in the absence of law (perhaps especially in the absence
of law) there are beneficial network externalities that arise from a common
sense of ownership. When the nexus between a thing and a person
becomes strong enough, we feel that the person is the owner.50 If a
Bourgeois strategy is part of our evolved psychological makeup, the
47. See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: How THE MIND CREATES
LANGUAGE (1994).
48. Giacomo Rizzolatti et al., Premotor Cortex and the Recognition ofMotor Actions, 3
CoGNITIvE BRAIN REs. 131, 134-36 (1996).
49. Id.
50. Ifthis is true, it would seem that the view that property is a relationship between persons
has less support than the older view that property is a relationship between a person and a thing.
Some Property professors get a bit mystical when discussing the idea of property. I think we are
better off defining the word to mean judicially enforceable rights in things and then moving on to
more important issues.
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necessarily underlying shared sense ofwhen to be assertive and when to be
deferential is an innate sense of possession, and that sense could be
embodied in the common law. Because possession is, in turn, the
foundation of our law of property,5 a large part of our property law could
be built upon distinctions embedded in the structure of our brains.
Much of our knowledge about mirror neurons and similar structures in
the brain is quite recent, and there is obviously a huge amount still to learn.
Because this scientific knowledge is new, we cannot expect it to have had
much impact on the development of the law. Jones says it is a paradox that
behavior arises from the fumctional design of the brain but we in law have
historically not exhibited interest in brain design.52 The youth of our
knowledge explains the paradox. There has in the past been little science
that could make a useful connection between brain structure and behavior.
Now that the connections are being made, we can expect the law,
gradually, to make use of that knowledge.
C. ChallengingOur TraditionalNormative Justificationsfor Law
One of the scarier potential consequences of understanding human
behavior is that it may make it harder for us to place moral blame on
persons behaving harmfully. We do not generally assign moral
responsibility for predetermined actions. Behavioral biology has the
troubling potential to place many actions that now appear intentional into
the predetermined category. Suppose, for example, that evolutionary theory
predicts that males will become enraged when they see their mates naked
in the arms of another male. And suppose that science confirms that nearly
all males in such situations inevitably would shoot the intruder if a gun
were available. If we decide, for whatever reason, that it should be
perfectly legal and moral for people to keep guns handy in their bedrooms,
it becomes difficult to place moral blame on a person for reacting as nearly
all persons of his sex inevitably would react in his position. The fact that
behavioral biology has undermined one rationale for punishment, does not,
of course, mean that we cannot punish the killer. The behavioral facts
assumed above do not eliminate all bases for punishment.53 But those facts,

51. See Carol Rose, Possessionas the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,74 (1985);
Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1221-22 (1979).
52. See Jones, supranote 3, at 833.
53. Deterrence remains a rationale for punishment if some men might not respond
automatically, i.e., some have exceptional power of self control, and we cannot distinguish those
few from those who do respond automatically. To deter them, we need to apply the penalty to all
even though some could not help their actions. Another utilitarian rationale for punishment is
aspimtional. Even if it had no deterrence, we might want to punish for symbolic reasons. It is a way
of reaffirming the high value we place on life. Yet another rationale for punishing is to define who
belongs to our community. We may wish to define ourselves as people who are not killers, even if
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were they established, would, at least for some people, undermine moral
retribution as a ground for punishment. 4
D. PredictingCosts and Benefits ofLegal Rules
It is not hard to see the potential of behavioral science to improve our
prediction of the costs and benefits of legal rules. To continue this
cuckoldry example, science might also tell us that increasing the sentence
from one year to ten years would reduce the number of shootings from 52
to 50 in a given period. The total amount ofjail time for this crime would
thus increase from 52 to 500 years. 5 Would we wish to suffer that loss of
utility in order to save the lives of two people? Behavioral science cannot
make that choice for us, but it can clarify the options.
E. The Law ofLaw's Leverage
This general topic, human responsiveness to changes in legal
disincentives, is the core of another of Jones's discoveries, what he calls
the law of law's leverage, or LLL 6 As I understand it, LLL says that the
difficulty of discouraging a behavior varies with the adaptivity of a
predisposition to that behavior in past environments. Behaviors range
continuously on a scale from maladaptive through non-adaptive to
adaptive, and the further they are toward the adaptive end of the scale, the
harder we must work to reduce their frequency. 7 I find this to be a very
interesting concept, and it is easy to imagine that it will deepen our
understanding of law's form and function.
I would, however, like to make explicit three points that Jones surely
assumes. First, context matters. It could have been the case that even in the
that is not true. Incapacitation might also work as ajustification in some such situations, so long
as there is a basis for differentiating the risk posed by some men, even though response is

automatic.
54. As the French might say, "Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner." On the theory of
retributivism, see generally Joseph L.Hoffmann, On the PerilsofLine Drawing: Juveniles andthe
Death Penalty,40 HASTINGS L. J. 229 (1989) (explaining different aspects of retributivism).
55. I recall that Warren Schwartz made this point in his 1980 Criminal Law course at
Georgetown University Law Center. He described this trade-off as being a point about "infra
marginal" effects. When we think about raising the penalty for certain behavior, we need to
consider the effect on all of the "infra-marginal" people who are not deterred by the law as well as
those at the margin who are deterred.
56. Jones, supra note 3, at 840-42.
57. Id. at 866. Jones says that divorce rates are less sensitive to divorce laws than we
commonly think. It should be mentioned that there are scholars that have found that legal rules do
affect divorce rates. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-FaultLaws and At-Fault
People, 18 INTL. REV. OF L. & ECoN. 325, 339 (1998) (arguing that divorce rates increase with nofault laws); Leora Friedberg, Did UnilateralDivorce Raise Divorce Rates?: Evidence from Panel
Data, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 608 (1988).

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53

environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA), s8 rape was adaptive in
some circumstances and maladaptive in others. Attempting to rape a
woman in the presence of her mate holding a club would have been
maladaptive, a behavior not on average helpful in getting the rapist's genes
passed to the next generation and more likely tesulting in death. On the
other hand, raping a woman after the rapist's tribe has just killed all the
males in the victim's tribe is much more likely to be adaptive. The law of
law's leverage suggests that rape in the latter context will be much harder
to discourage than in the former.5 9 If that is the case, we might want to
raise the punishment for rape in circumstances in which the perpetrator is
less likely to be caught. When, as is likely in this example, it is possible for
the brain to be programmed to discriminate between various contexts, the
law of law's leverage should be viewed as applying to the behavior
separately in each of those possible contexts.
Second, some behaviors had no occasion to occur in the environment
of evolutionary adaptation. Take, for example, driving on the left side of
a solid yellow line. The type of intergenerational giving prohibited by the
rule against perpetuities is also an example of behavior that was not
common in the EEA. Such behaviors cannot be called adaptive or
maladaptive in the environment of evolutionary adaptation because the
behavior never happened in the EEA. Hence, we should consider it to be
non-adaptive, neither adaptive nor maladaptive, on the ground that the
EEA had no opportunity to select in favor or against brain modules
triggering such behavior.
As we can see on further reflection, any behavior (including its context)
that existed both in the EEA and today has been subjected to
environmental selection forces for a long time. As a result, it is likely that
such behaviors are adaptive at least to some degree and we will have some
preference for them. On the other hand, behaviors that did not occur in the
EEA will be less resistant to change. But the LLL is not simply a rule that
older behaviors will be harder to change. Among old behaviors there may
be large differences in degree of adaptivity. Running from a snake may be
a stronger preference than engaging in sex, which may be a stronger
preference than wrestling with a sibling. For that reason, Jones's LLL

58. Although there is much argument about how much humans are evolving by natural
selection today, there is little disagreement that much of our special genetic nature was formed
during the long period ofhuman evolution prior to the emergence of civilization. The environment
of evolutionary adaption, or EEA, refers to the environment that existed when a particular trait
evolved.
59. There are, of course, at least two possibilities regarding a proclivity to rape. One is that
the proclivity is not sensitive to context. Ifnot, it could continue as a behavioral pattern as long as
it carries a genetic advantage on average. It is also possible, as suggested here, for the proclivity to
become highly sensitive to context, a preference that is felt only in very special circumstances.
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would say that it is harder to change the frequency of running from snakes
than it is to change the frequency of sibling wrestling, even though both
behaviors have been around for time immemorial.
Third, it is important in all of this not to commit the naturalistic fallacy,
not to confuse "is" with "ought."6 Jones raises the example of crimes of
passion being treated differently from premeditated crimes.6 1 He says that
emotional crimes are less easily controlled. Although this may start to
explain why we make a distinction, it does not take us all the way to a
justification for it. So what if crimes of passion arise out of biologically
programmed emotions? Should those crimes draw greater sentences
because they are harder to deter or lesser sentences because it is
understandable that the person behaved that way? If our normative position
is that we want to get the most deterrence for the least cost, we get the
most bang for our buck by punishing premeditated crimes. But if our
normative position is that we want to deter as many crimes of passion as
we deter crimes of premeditation, we need to heighten punishment for
crimes of passion. Whether the price in added jail time is justified by the
increased deterrence is something behavioral biology cannot answer.
Although biology can help predict the comparative costs of different rules,
it cannot make the choice between the rules. Once again, the evolutionary
analysis does not answer the normative questions, but it can elucidate the
trade-offs.
III. CONCLUSION

Some of my comments may fail to address directly Jones's main
enterprise, linking behavioral biology to law at a theoretical level,
developing proprioceptive sense of law.62 That is due in part to the fact that
I applaud his initiative. It ought to be a fruitful avenue of research, and
Jones has provided a nice look at some of the ways in which behavioral
biology may provide insights into the form of law. His efforts to paint a
picture of laws taking only a few of the many potential forms and his idea
that design space is vast while actual design is a very small and finite
subset of that space63 are especially welcome. We do need greater
understanding of what law is and what it could be (but is not), and Jones
has taken a bold step in that search.

Jones is, of course, keen to this distinction. See Jones, supra note 3, at 870-72.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 835.
For more on the idea of design space, see generally DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S
DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 124-35 (1996) (describing the design
space for biological organisms).
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Those at the vanguard of a new interdisciplinary approach to law take
so much flak from scholars with established perspectives that it would be
hard for them, the pioneers, to continue if they did not have inflated
aspirations for the potential in their new perspective. At times Jones,
though a very careful scholar, appears to claim too much. A better science
of human behavior might lead to better law, but we ought not be too
confident about that. On the other hand, I would make some claims for the
evolutionary science of memetics that Jones shies away from. The future
will tell whether either or both of us are too optimistic. One prediction I
will make with confidence, however, is that evolutionary analysis of law
will make for some interesting and enlightening reading. Imagine law and
behavioral biology, it's easy if you try.

